Beijing has sought to portray itself as a friend to all in the region and the enemy of none, but the polarization over the conflict is making that strategic approach difficult to sustain.

On Oct. 30,  that  provided by Chinese tech companies Baidu and Alibaba, effectively signaling 鈥 or so some believed 鈥 that Beijing was siding with Hamas over Israel in the ongoing war.

Within hours, Chinese officials  on that narrative, pointing out that the names do appear on the country鈥檚 official maps and that the maps offered by China鈥檚 tech companies had not changed at all since the Oct. 7 attack by Hamas. Indeed, the  took the opportunity to go further, emphasizing that China was not taking sides in the conflict. Rather, Beijing said it respected both Israel鈥檚 right to self defense and the rights of the Palestinian people under international humanitarian law.

This assertion of balance and even-handedness should have come as a surprise to no one. It has been the bedrock of  for more than a decade, during which time Beijing has sought to portray itself as a friend to all in the region and the enemy of none.

But the map episode underscores a problem Beijing faces over the current crisis. The  over this conflict 鈥 in both the Middle East itself   鈥 is making Beijing鈥檚 strategic approach to the Middle East increasingly difficult to sustain.

Chinese President Xi Jinping Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas
China鈥檚 President Xi Jinping welcomed Palestinian President Mahmud Abbas during ceremony in Beijing earlier this year. (Screenshot/CCTV/2023)

As a , I believe that the Israel-Hamas war is posing the sternest test yet of President Xi Jinping鈥檚 Middle East strategy 鈥 that to date has been centered around the .鈥 Growing  in China 鈥 and the  in the region 鈥 suggest that if Xi is forced off the impartiality road, he will side with the Palestinians over the Israelis.

But it is a choice Beijing would rather not make 鈥 and for wise economic and foreign policy reasons. Making such a choice would, I believe, effectively mark the end of China鈥檚 decade-long effort to positioning itself as an  鈥 an outside power that seeks to broker peace deals and create a truly inclusive regional economic and security order.

Beijing鈥檚 Objectives And Strategies

Whereas in decades past the conventional wisdom in diplomatic circles was that China was not that invested in the Middle East, this has not been true since about 2012. From that time onward, China has  building its influence in the region.

Beijing鈥檚 overall strategic vision for the Middle East is one in which U.S. influence is significantly reduced while China鈥檚 is significantly enhanced.

On the one hand, this is merely a regional manifestation of a global vision 鈥 as set out in a series of Chinese foreign policy initiatives such as the , ,  and  鈥 all of which are designed, in part at least, to appeal to  that feel increasingly alienated from the U.S.-led rules-based international order.

It is a vision grounded in fears that a continuation of United States dominance in the Middle East would threaten China鈥檚  exports.

That isn鈥檛 to say that Beijing is seeking to displace the United States as the dominant power in the region. That is infeasible given the power of the dollar and the U.S.鈥榮 longstanding relations with some of the region鈥檚 biggest economies.

Rather, China鈥檚 stated plan is to  among countries in the region 鈥 that is to encourage individual nations to engage with China in areas such as infrastructure and trade. Doing so not only creates relationships between China and players in the region, it also weakens any incentives to join exclusive U.S.-led blocs.

Beijing seeks to promote multi-alignment through what is described in Chinese government documents as 鈥溾 and 鈥.鈥

Balanced diplomacy entails not taking sides in various conflicts 鈥 including the Israeli-Palestinian one 鈥 and not making any enemies. Positive balancing centers on pursuing closer cooperation with one regional power, say Iran in the belief that this will incentivize others 鈥 for example, Arab Gulf countries 鈥 to follow suit.

China鈥檚 Middle East Success

Prior to to the Oct. 7 Hamas attack on Israel, Beijing鈥檚 strategy was beginning to pay considerable dividends. 

In 2016, China entered with Saudi Arabia and in 2020 signed a agreement with Iran. Over that same timespan, Beijing has expanded economic ties with a host of other Gulf countries including , , the ,  and .

Beyond the Gulf, China has also deepened its economic ties with Egypt, to the point where it is now the  in the Suez Canal Area Development Project. It has also invested in  and .

Earlier this year, China brokered a deal to re-establish diplomatic relations between Saudi Arabia and Iran 鈥 a major breakthrough and one that  in the region. 

In fact, following that success,  as a potential broker of peace between Israel and the Palestinians.

The Impact Of The Israel-Hamas War

The Israel-Hamas war, however, has complicated China鈥檚 approach to the Middle East.

Beijing鈥檚 initial response to the conflict was to continue with its balanced diplomacy. In the aftermath of the Oct. 7 attack, China鈥檚 leaders , instead they urged both sides to 鈥渆xercise restraint鈥 and to embrace a 鈥渢wo-state solution.鈥

This is consistent with Beijing鈥檚 long-standing policy of 鈥溾 in other countries鈥 internal affairs and its fundamental strategic approach to the region. 

But the neutral stance jarred with the approach adopted by the United States and some European nations 鈥 which pushed China for a firmer line. 

Under pressure from , among others, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi reiterated China鈥檚 view that . But he qualified this by stating that Israel 鈥渟hould abide by international humanitarian law and protect the safety of civilians.鈥 

And that qualification reflects a shift in the tone from Beijing, which has moved progressively toward making statements that are sympathetic to the Palestinians and critical of Israel. On Oct. 25, China  to block a U.S. resolution calling for a humanitarian pause on the grounds that it failed to call on Israel to lift is siege on Gaza.

China鈥檚 U.N. ambassador, Zhang Jun, explained the decision  the 鈥渟trong appeals of the entire world, in particular the Arab countries.鈥

Championing The Global South

Such a shift is unsurprising given Beijing鈥檚 economic concerns and its geopolitical ambitions.

China is much more heavily dependent on  it has established economic ties . 

Should geopolitical pressures push China to the point where it must decide between Israel and the Arab world, Beijing has powerful economic incentives to side with the latter.

But China has another powerful incentive to side with the Palestinians. Beijing  of the Global South. And siding with Israel risks alienating that . 

In countries across Africa, Latin America and beyond, the Palestinians鈥 struggle against Israel is seen as akin to  or .鈥 Siding with Israel would, under that lens, put China on the side of the colonial oppressor. And that, in turn, risks undermining the diplomatic and economic work China has undertaken through its infrastructure development program, the , and effort to encourage more Global South countries to join what is now the .

And while China may not have altered its maps of the Middle East, its diplomats may well be looking at them and wondering if there is still room for balanced diplomacy.

This article is republished from  under a Creative Commons license. Read .

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