Addressing the East-West Center in Honolulu, Shinichi Kitaoka asserted that 鈥淛apan will never become a military power again.鈥� He contended that would be 鈥渦nthinkable鈥� because the reasons Japan went down a militaristic path from 1931 to 1945 no longer existed.

Instead, Kitaoka insisted, Prime Minister Abe鈥檚 plans to reinterpret Japan鈥檚 constitution to permit collective defense, to establish a national security council, and to publish Tokyo鈥檚 first national security strategy were intended only to exercise the sovereign right of self-defense.

But neither Kitaoka, who was Japan鈥檚 deputy ambassador to the United Nations 2004-2006, nor other advisers to the prime minister nor the drafters of a new U.S.-Japan defense agreement signed earlier this month have confronted two towering obstacles, one internal, the other external, to their plans:

• Internally, many Japanese 鈥� or their parents or grandparents 鈥� who recall the misery and devastation that was the consequence of Japan鈥檚 militaristic ventures in the last century are skeptical or suspicious of Abe鈥檚 call for new defensive measures. That has been compounded by deep-seated pacifism in Japan.
• Externally, China and Korea have fired one barrage after another at Abe and his call for improved Japanese defenses. Both have demanded that the Japanese acknowledge their earlier transgressions but the Chinese have been understated while the South Koreans have been emotional to bordering on irrational.

Several Korean legislators issued a statement reflecting widespread Korean sentiment: “Given no sufficient repentance over its past atrocities and no sufficient compensation for them, Japan seeking to become a military power under the pretext of self-defense would give a deep scar to neighboring countries that suffered from Japan’s past aggression.”

Curiously, South Korea鈥檚 new president, Park Geun-Hye, has been outspoken in her demand that Japan face up to 鈥渢he history question,鈥� meaning Japan鈥檚 35 year rule of Korea that ended in 1945. Yet her father, the late President Park Chung-Hee, was a young officer in the Japanese Imperial Army in Manchuria, then a Japanese colony.

In his remarks, Kitaoka said Japan embarked on conquest in the last century to expand its markets and because Japan saw its enemies as weak. He said the international community lacked punitive sanctions and Japan鈥檚 political leaders could not control its military forces. The lack of free speech in Japan also contributed.

Kitaoka, who sits on several advisory panels advising Prime Minister Abe, contended those factors 鈥渄o not apply to today鈥檚 Japan.鈥�

Instead, he said, the Abe government would have a national security council in place and a new outline of defense planning adopted by the end of this year.

In contrast, Kitaoka pointed to China, asserting that Beijing has moving down the same road as Japan earlier as it escalates its maritime actions and seems confident that China鈥檚 forces could prevail in Asia. He argued that China has no fear of international sanctions and was using its economic power to silence critics in other nations.

Moreover, he questioned the capacity of the Communist Party to control the People鈥檚 Liberation Army, which encompasses all of China鈥檚 military forces. (U.S. officers with access to intelligence reports have raised similar questions.) And Kitaoka said it was difficult for Chinese to speak out against their government.

Meantime, Foreign Minister Fumio Kishida and Defense Minister Itsunori Onodera of Japan joined with Secretary of State John Kerry and Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel to issue a communiqu茅 in which the U.S. 鈥漺elcomed Japan鈥檚 determination to contribute more proactively to regional and global peace and security.鈥�

In the most forthright affirmation of the U.S.-Japan alliance seen in years, the U.S. 鈥渞eiterated its commitment to collaborate closely with Japan.鈥� Kerry and Hagel applauded Abe鈥檚 plans to assert Japan鈥檚 right to collective self-defense, to expand its defense budget, and to strengthen defense of sovereign territory.

In particular, the ministers agreed that the U.S.-Japan defense guidelines, last revised in 1997, would be brought up to date, given the changes in Asia in recent years, notably the emergence of Chinese power and the threat of nuclear attack by North Korea.

In sum, the Japanese and Americans agreed on where they want to go but not on how to get there over the vehement objections of some in the Japanese public and many in China and Korea.

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Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel and Minister of National Defense Kim Kwan-jin, sought to paper over differences about who would be responsible for defending South Korea and who would pay for it. On the other hand, Hagel was forceful in confirming that the U.S. 鈥渘uclear umbrella鈥� protected South Korea.

A basic issue was the transfer of operational control over South Korean forces in wartime. Today, an American general has, in military lingo, OPCON over both South Korean and U.S. forces should war break out. South Korea controls peacetime training and deployment of ROK forces.

The U.S. has long wanted to shed wartime OPCON, asserting that South Koreans should take full responsibility for their own defense. But ROK leaders have twice succeeded in putting off that transfer until late 2015, arguing that they were not ready and that North Korea would be tempted to attack after the change.

In a press conference, Kim said: 鈥淪ecretary Hagel and I share an understanding on the condition-based OPCON transition.鈥�

He added: 鈥淲e have further agreed to create a ROK-U.S. joint working group to discuss these issues.鈥�

Hagel said he was optimistic that they would agree and 鈥渨e will get to where we need to be.鈥�

Translation: We have agreed on nothing and will keep on talking.

Further, the U.S. wants to dismantle the Combined Forces Command in which American and South Korean officers share the planning and logistic support to U.S. and ROK forces. Both sides make the same argument as that with OPCON transfer.

The underlying fear of the South Koreans, which civilian officials and military officers express freely in private, is that the U.S. will withdraw forces from Korea despite repeated pledges that the U.S. was committed to the defense of South Korea.

In a communiqu茅, Hagel 鈥漴eiterated the firm and unwavering U.S. commitment to the defense of the ROK” not only with forces on the Korean Peninsula but from anywhere else in the world.

Actually, the U.S. has long been reducing its forces in Korea. The U.S. position, which the South Koreans don鈥檛 accept, has been that the presence of U.S. military forces is not necessary to confirm treaty and political commitments to the ROK.

In the communiqu茅, Hagel 鈥渞eiterated the commitment to maintain the current level of U.S. military personnel鈥� in the ROK. While literally accurate, note that he did not say what the level was.

The U.S. has pledged to keep 28,500 troops in Korea. But the Pentagon, Pacific Command in Hawaii, and U.S. Forces Korea, the headquarters in Seoul, refuse to disclose the actual figure. Privately, informed officers suggest that it is well below 25,000 and mostly in support rather than combat units.

Further, rather than assigning U.S. soldiers to Korea for one- or two-year tours, the Army has begun deploying forces from the U.S. on rotations. In late September, an armed reconnaissance squadron from Washington state arrived in Korea with 380 soldiers and 30 Kiowa helicopters. They will go home in nine months.

Moreover, the mission of U.S. forces in Korea has changed. While they would help defend South Korea, they are focused more on contingencies elsewhere, much like U.S. forces on the Japanese island of Okinawa. They might be called on to help defend Japan but are more concerned with threats outside of Japan.

To be ready for that new mission, the U.S. forces in South Korea are being consolidated into fewer bases from which they can be deployed on short notice. Army infantry units are being withdrawn from camps north of Seoul and are being gathered into a new post in Pyeongtaek, 35 miles south of Seoul and near a port and an air base.

Hagel and Kim reaffirmed that the United Nations Command remained crucial to peace in Korea. In reality, the UN Command has become a paper headquarters left over from UN resolutions adopted in 1950 when the Korean War erupted. It serves only to give an appearance of legality to U.S. and a few other forces in Korea.

Asked what would be Korea鈥檚 share of the cost of maintaining U.S. forces in Korea, Kim said that the amount has 鈥漼et to be negotiated.鈥�

Hagel said: 鈥淲e’ll adjust. We are adjusting now. We have to adjust.鈥�

The Yonhap News Agency reported that the U.S. wanted the ROK to pay $934 million next year while South Korea offered $186 million less.

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The question is whether anyone outside of the U.S. caught the president鈥檚 fundamental but gently delivered message. Initial indications are that they either missed his point or ignored it.

鈥淭he United States,鈥� the president said, 鈥渉as a hard-earned humility when it comes to our ability to determine events inside other countries. The notion of American empire may be useful propaganda, but it isn鈥檛 borne out by America鈥檚 current policy or by public opinion.鈥�

鈥淚ndeed, as recent debates within the United States over Syria clearly show,鈥� he asserted, 鈥渢he danger for the world is not an America that is too eager to immerse itself in the affairs of other countries or to take on every problem in the region as its own.鈥�

Quite to the contrary, the president contended, 鈥渢he danger for the world is that the United States, after a decade of war 鈥� rightly concerned about issues back home, aware of the hostility that our engagement in the region has engendered throughout the Muslim world 鈥� may disengage, creating a vacuum of leadership.鈥�

鈥滻 believe America must remain engaged for our own security,鈥� the president argued.

He said Americans 鈥渉ave shown a willingness through the sacrifice of blood and treasure to stand up not only for our own narrow self-interests, but for the interests of all.鈥�

Then came the call to other nations: 鈥淚 must be honest, though. We’re far more likely to invest our energy in those countries that want to work with us, that invest in their people instead of a corrupt few; that embrace a vision of society where everyone can contribute 鈥� men and women, Shia or Sunni, Muslim, Christian or Jew.鈥�

The president鈥檚 address came against the backdrop of the national debate over U.S. policy toward Syria, as the president noted. It seems clear that a majority of Americans 鈥� and their representatives in Congress 鈥� are against actions that might draw the US into a full-blown intervention.

Perhaps more important, his words reflected a deep-seated revival of isolationism. The Pew Research Center in Washington recently published an incisive report saying the American public today 鈥渇eels little responsibility and inclination to deal with international problems that are not seen as direct threats to the national interest.鈥�

鈥淭he depth and duration of the public鈥檚 disengagement these days,鈥� Pew said, 鈥済oes well beyond periodic spikes in isolationist sentiment.鈥� Those spikes erupted in 1974 after the unpopular war in Vietnam, in 1992 following the collapse of the Soviet Union, and in 2006 when protracted conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan caused disillusion.

Further, Pew found an upward trend among Americans who said: 鈥淲e should not think so much in international terms but concentrate more on our own national problems.鈥�

The Pew report pointed to 鈥渢he gravity of domestic concerns,鈥� notably jobs and the economy, and to 鈥渁 sense of war weariness.鈥�

All that appears not to have registered with America鈥檚 allies and friends. Prime Minister Shinzo Abe of Japan, for instance, was in New York at the same time as President Obama. Although the Japanese leader said his nation would not be a 鈥渨eak link鈥� in the security of Asia, he announced no specific plan or timetable for getting there.

In South Korea, neither the Chosun Ilbo nor the Jungang Ilbo, two of the leading newspapers, reported the president鈥檚 remarks. The English-language Korea Times lamented that Mr. Obama did not mention North Korea and 鈥渄idn’t even touch on Asia, despite his signature foreign policy of rebalancing toward the Asia-Pacific region.鈥�

The Times of India noted President Obama鈥檚 warning that the U.S. might disengage and commented: 鈥淚n the new world disorder, the U.S. can be simultaneously accused of interfering in other countries’ affairs and also upbraided for shirking its responsibility as the world’s sole superpower.鈥�

In Britain, which has declined to support the U.S. on Syria, The Times of London and the Guardian ignored the president鈥檚 caution. In Paris, the newspaper Le Monde and the news agency Agence France Presse also ignored the president鈥檚 remarks although France has aligned itself with the U.S. on Syria.

President Obama, Secretary of State John Kerry, and Secretary of Defense Chuck Hagel will have another chance to publicize the president鈥檚 thinking as each travels to Asia in early October. Maybe they should hit the president鈥檚 theme a bit harder.

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Taxis were lined up three abreast and 12 deep in front of a railroad station with the line barely moving because few riders were hailing them. Shoppers were sparse on a weekend in a nearby department store, even among the counters piled high with inexpensive clothes imported from China.

Several restaurants were only a third to half full on different evenings. A music store with instruments in the window priced at $100 to $5,000 blared tunes into the street but was empty of potential buyers. A longtime resident said that property values were continuing to slide.

鈥淚t鈥檚 that way all over Japan,鈥� said a senior editor. 鈥淧eople don鈥檛 feel like the economic recovery has reached them.鈥�

As if to underscore that assessment, Japan鈥檚 leading breweries reported that beer shipments nationwide dropped 2.8 percent in August compared with a year ago. The 41 million cases that were shipped marked the lowest level since 1992 despite the unusually blistering heat of this past summer.

Hachioji, which means 鈥淓ight Princes,鈥� was a castle town sitting astride a main road running to the west from Edo, now Tokyo, the seat of government in Japan鈥檚 feudal era. During the Meiji period of Japan鈥檚 modernization, Hachioji was incorporated into Tokyo, the capital that is like a prefecture or state.

Now Hachioji is a mid-sized city of 550,000 people that reflects similar communities all over Japan. Situated 25 miles from the center of Tokyo, Hachioji is the site of 17 universities and the dignified tombs of the Showa Emperor and Empress, the posthumous titles of Emperor Hirohito, who reigned from 1926 to 1989, and Empress Nagako.

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who has been in office just under a year, has been credited with having revived an economy that had been in the doldrums for two decades. As creator of 鈥淎benomics,鈥� he has begun a fiscal stimulus, installed new leaders in the central bank, and initiated structural reform.

A government report last week said 鈥渢he economy is on the way to recovery at a moderate pace.鈥� But the report acknowledged that personal spending had been pulled back.

At the same time, Abe has been widely reported as preparing to ask the Diet, or national legislature, to raise the consumer tax to 8 percent from its present 5 percent. He is also said to be considering a cut in corporate taxes. That combination is almost certain to stir political controversy.

Already those proposals have caused critics, even in his own Liberal Democratic Party (LDP), to question his judgment. 鈥淎be is cautious,鈥� says one analyst. 鈥淗e has shown himself to be a good talker but whether he is a good actor …鈥� Her voice trailed off.

For the past 20 years, Japan鈥檚 prime ministers have lasted in office for about a year each, except for Junichiro Koizumi, who served from 2001 to 2006. That turnover does not make for continuity in policy or leadership. Even so, said another analyst, there has so far been no visible movement within the party to ease Abe out.

Several polls seemed to confirm that. They said that the approval rating for Abe and his cabinet hovered around a respectable 61 percent.

In Washington, the Congressional Research Service (CRS), noting the interaction of the U.S. and Japanese economies, said 鈥渢he mediocre performance of the Japanese economy over the last two decades鈥� had been exacerbated by the global economic slowdown and the tsunami, earthquake, and nuclear accidents of March 2011.

鈥淛apan,鈥� the CRS concluded in a report last month, 鈥渋s still struggling to achieve sustained economic recovery.鈥�

In a less gloomy event, the nominee to be the U.S. ambassador to Tokyo, Caroline Kennedy, testified before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee last week. The daughter of the late President John F. Kennedy said: 鈥淭his appointment has a special significance as we commemorate the fiftieth anniversary of my father鈥檚 Presidency.鈥�

鈥淎s a World War II veteran who served in the Pacific,鈥� she said, 鈥渉e had hoped to be the first sitting President to make a state visit to Japan.鈥� During the war, John Kennedy鈥檚 PT-109 patrol boat was sunk by the Japanese destroyer Amagiri in the South Pacific. The future president was later reconciled with the Amagiri鈥檚 captain, Kohei Hanami.

Caroline Kennedy concluded: 鈥淚f confirmed as Ambassador, I would be humbled to carry forward his legacy in a small way and represent the powerful bonds that unite our two democratic societies.鈥�

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鈥淛apan has been dispirited for two decades,鈥� said a retired senior official, pointing to longstanding economic doldrums and political indifference that was capped by the devastating earthquake, tsunami and nuclear leakage of March 2011. Some 21,000 people died in that disaster, including 4,800 whose remains have never been found. Nearly 290,000 are living in shelters or with relatives or some place other than home.

Many Japanese seem to see the Olympics as a way to pull out of their national distress. Japanese have a way of setting collective goals, then striving together to achieve them. The 1964 Olympics was integrated into Prime Minister Hayato Ikeda鈥檚 plan to double the national income in 10 years, and accomplished in little more than five.

That was a time for the massive construction of highways, subways, and what was to become the widely acclaimed 鈥� and copied 鈥� 鈥渟hinkansen鈥� high-speed railroad. The economic growth rate at one point hit an astounding 17.5 percent and the games themselves were well conducted.

The high point came during the opening ceremony when a young Japanese runner, Yoshinori Sakai, carried a torch to the top of the stadium to light the Olympic flame. He had been born on Aug. 6, 1945, in Hiroshima, the day the U.S. dropped the atomic bomb on that city to end World War II.

In a nation that cherishes symbols, the message that Sakai carried was unmistakable: Japan had recovered from the devastation and humiliation of defeat in the war to take its rightful place among nations. Look for a similar symbolic action in Tokyo 2020.

An evident goal for 2020 will be the elimination of a threat from the nuclear reactors in Fukushima on the Pacific coast east of Tokyo. They were severely damaged by the earthquake and tsunami and are still leaking contaminated water.

Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who flew from the G2 economic summit in Russia to Buenos Aires to take part in Japan鈥檚 bid for the 2020 games, made an international pledge that the athletes would not be endangered.

Some of the facilities built for the 1964 games will be refurbished for 2020 but many will be constructed anew. Perhaps the centerpiece will be a stadium with 80,000 seats and a retractable roof to keep out the bad weather, including the heat of July and August. Tokyo is just now emerging from a blistering summer.

An Olympic village to house the athletes and officials will be built near Tokyo Bay and will include a berm to protect the community from a tsunami. The village will be only five miles from the athletic venues to spare the athletes from being held up in Tokyo鈥檚 sometimes fearsome traffic.

A touchy issue: Will Japan willingly set as an objective of the 2020 Olympics a resolution of the so-called 鈥渉istory question,鈥� 鈥� or will it be coerced into taking it up? The term encompasses a litany of issues with which Koreans and Chinese, in particular, contend that Japan has never come to terms.

The Joong Ang Ilbo, a leading newspaper in Seoul, lost no time in bringing up the history issue after Tokyo was awarded the 2020 summer games. While grudgingly approving that decision, the paper said: 鈥淛apan must stop escalating conflicts and tensions with its neighbors over territorial and historical issues.鈥�

From all accounts, Japan mounted an effective campaign to be awarded the games. Four women were evidently critical to the success of 鈥淭eam Japan.鈥�

Princess Hisako, a member of the imperial family, was technically not part of the Japanese delegation at the insistence of the Imperial Household Agency, which struggles to keep the imperial family out of politics. The princess drew attention, however, by expressing Japan鈥檚 gratitude for the help of athletes after the tsunami.

Christel Takigawa, a popular TV anchor whose father is French and mother Japanese, put her linguistics skills to work as Japan鈥檚 cultural ambassador to the International Olympic Committee. Similarly, Mariko Nagai, an experienced interpreter, compiled a list of 500 Olympic terms and appropriate Japanese translations, never an easy task.

Mami Sato, an athlete who lost a leg to cancer not only came back to compete as a paralympian in the long jump, but related to the committee how the tsunami had wiped out her home town. For six days, she said, she did not know whether her family was alive or dead.

From these experiences, she said, 鈥淚 learned that what was important was what I had, not what I had lost.鈥�

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Today, President Barack Obama, having ignited a political firestorm with his proposal to attack Syria with congressional approval, seems to have applied some of those lessons while leaving others on the table.

Among the most widely applauded assessments of the Vietnam experience was that of Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger forged with the help of his military assistant, Maj. Gen. Colin Powell. In 1984, Weinberger set down six tests to be met when considering the use of military force in the future.

• The U.S. should commit forces only to defend a vital national interest.

President Obama has given himself about 10 days to define the 鈥渧ital national interest鈥� in Syria and to persuade the Congress and the public to accept his judgment. Congress has agreed to begin deliberations next week.

• That commitment should be made only with the intention of winning.

The president has, in effect, ruled out the need to win, at least in the classic sense of victory on the battlefield. But he has left open the chance to define winning as imposing American will on the rulers of Syria.

• The U.S. should have clearly defined political and military objectives.

The president has started down that road and, as with the national interest, given himself 10 days to define objectives and to persuade the Congress and the voters to agree with him.

• The composition of U.S. military forces in relation to the objective that is sought must be continually reassessed.

The president has said a strike against Syria would be limited, would rely on cruise missiles fired from afar, would not put American bomber crews in harm鈥檚 way and would not require 鈥渂oots on the ground.鈥� Whether that promise will hold remains to be seen.

• There must be 鈥渞easonable assurance鈥� that the military operations will be supported by the American people.

Of all the lessons to come out of the Vietnam experience, this may be the most important. Without wide public support, failure is almost guaranteed. As a chief of staff of the Army, Gen. Edward Meyer, once said: 鈥淎rmies don鈥檛 fight wars, nations fight wars.鈥�

• The commitment of U.S. forces to combat should be the last resort.

This test may be the most debated in the public and congressional consideration of the president鈥檚 request for authority to use force against Syria. Many Americans appear ready to argue that the president has not applied enough political and diplomatic pressure on the Syrian leaders.

In presenting his six points, Weinberger contended that 鈥渆mploying our forces almost indiscriminately and as a regular and customary part of our diplomatic effort would surely plunge us headlong into the sort of domestic turmoil we experienced during the Vietnam war.鈥�

As if in reply, President Obama said Saturday afternoon: 鈥淎 country faces few decisions as grave as using military force, even when that force is limited. I respect the views of those who call for caution, particularly as our country emerges from a time of war that I was elected in part to end.鈥�

鈥淏ut if we really do want to turn away from taking appropriate action in the face of such an unspeakable outrage,鈥� Mr, Obama said, 鈥渢hen we must acknowledge the costs of doing nothing.鈥�

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Victor Cha, a scholar at Georgetown University in Washington who is among a handful of American authorities on North Korea, told a gathering at the East-West Center here that the dictatorial rulers in Pyongyang had made 鈥渇ive bad choices鈥� over the last six decades since the Korean War.

The author of a book entitled 鈥淭he Impossible State,鈥� Cha said that the bad decisions by Kim Il Sung, the founder of North Korea, son Kim Jong Il, and grandson Kim Jong Un, the current leader, were responsible for upward of a million deaths from malnutrition and disease over those years.

The gleam of light, Cha said, came from the estimated 2 million cell phones in North Korea now and the 15,000 connections to the Internet. 鈥淭his is something that is different,鈥� Cha said, 鈥渁nd it is only going to grow.鈥�

Cha suggested that the North Korean people would become gradually aware of what鈥檚 going on outside the Hermit Kingdom, notably in South Korea and Japan. He was quick to add, however, that he didn鈥檛 see a 鈥渄emocratic revolution鈥� erupting but unrest could 鈥渇racture the system under its incompetent leadership.鈥�

The scholar said he did not expect that awareness to have a profound effect on politics in North Korea because decades of close controls 鈥渉as had an impact on the North Korean mind.鈥� Thus, he did not see the possibility of an 鈥淎rab spring鈥� in Pyongyang.

A critical question: Why should anyone outside of North Korea care?

Because North Korea is developing nuclear warheads and missiles that could reach the U.S., with targets beginning at the famed naval base at Pearl Harbor attacked by Japan in 1941 to bring the U.S. into World War II. Others would be the Army, Marine, and Air Force bases here.

The fear is that North Korean leaders, beset by economic difficulties, could become desperate. That, coupled with their ignorance of the outside world, especially of the U.S., could lead to miscalculation, historically the most frequent cause of war.

The seemingly unending stream of North Korean vitriol aimed at South Korea, Japan, and the U.S. has been toned down in recent weeks 鈥� but not gone away, by any means. Last week, the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA), the official mouthpiece of Pyongyang, accused President Park Geun Hye of South Korea of 鈥渢elling lies.鈥�

KCNA also protested 鈥渢he reckless nuclear war moves and confrontational racket against the DPRK being kicked up by the U.S. and the South Korean warmongers.鈥� As for Japan, it was criticized for 鈥渢he mass killings of Koreans committed by the Japanese authorities during the great Kanto quake鈥濃��90 years ago.

There was a sliver of comic relief: Dennis Rodman, the flamboyant professional basketball player showed up in Pyongyang to see his pal, Marshal Kim Jong Un, and seek the freedom of an American citizen of Korean heritage, Kenneth Bae. But Rodman told the Associated Press: 鈥淭hat’s not my job.鈥�

The 鈥渇ive bad choices鈥� that Cha ascribed to the Kim Dynasty in Pyongyang were:

• In the 1950s, focusing on heavy industry instead of agriculture and light industry, the well-worn path that emerging economies have long trod;
• Demanding that the people work harder and for longer hours instead of increasing productivity with innovation, imported technology, and joint ventures with foreign firms;
• In the 1970s, during the U.S.-Soviet d茅tente, North Korea could have sought foreign loans but it became evident that Pyongyang could not pay interest or repay the loan.
• In the 1980s, Pyongyang suffered 鈥淥lympic envy鈥� when South Korea put on the games successfully. Instead, the Kim regime launched mega projects, including a luxury hotel in Pyongyang that is still not occupied but is 鈥渁 towering monument to economic failure.鈥�
• In the 1990s and beyond, North Korea has experienced crippling shortages of energy, massive floods, a refusal to reform, and diversions of food and funds to the armed forces. Foreign aid workers delivering food have been lied to constantly, which has led to 鈥渄onor fatigue鈥� and the departure of all but a few Chinese and South Koreans.

Maybe a sixth bad choice should be added, which is Kim Jong Un having North Korea line up with Syria. It has been accused of turning chemical weapons on its own people in violation of a slew of international agreements and standards.

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Ichiro, of course, is a Japanese professional baseball player with the New York Yankees. He slapped a stinging grounder past the Toronto Blue Jays third baseman to record the 4,000th hit of his career in Japan and America. Only two other pro players, Pete Rose and Ty Cobb, have passed the 4,000 mark.

Ichiro, who goes more by his given rather than his family name, said afterward he was 鈥渙verwhelmed鈥� by his teammates who poured out of the dugout to hug him and pat him on the back. 鈥淲hen my teammates came out to first base,鈥� Ichiro said later, 鈥渢hat was very special.鈥�

But it was the crowd in Yankee Stadium who provided the telling signal. Knowing he had 3,999 hits under his belt, they began chanting as he came to the plate: 鈥淚-chiro, I-chiro, I-chiro.鈥� As soon as the ball he hit had zipped through the infield, the fans erupted into a standing ovation.

Ichiro waited until his teammates returned to the dugout, then took off his batting helmet and bowed to the fans in three different directions. You can take the baseball player out of Japan but you can鈥檛 take Japan out of the baseball player. 鈥淚 wasn鈥檛 expecting so much joy and happiness from them,鈥� Ichiro said later.

Ichiro鈥檚 feat 鈥� and the American applause 鈥� reverberated across the Pacific. After the game, the Japanese press queried Ichiro for 47 minutes. Their reports, pictures, and videos got top play in Japan. Even Prime Minister Shinzo Abe commented: 鈥淚t鈥檚 an astronomical number. He鈥檚 set a new standard in baseball.鈥�

There was also something very American about the scene. Here was an Asian athlete being pummeled in congratulation by teammates who were Caucasian, African-American, Hispanic, and Asian. Ichiro鈥檚 compatriot, pitcher Hiroki Kuroda, presumably told Ichiro: 鈥淥medeto (congratulations).鈥�

The enthusiastic outburst of goodwill by the Yankee fans recalled the gratitude expressed by countless Japanese to Americans, formally and informally, for their help after Japan鈥檚 northeast coast was struck by an earthquake and tsunami and consequent nuclear leakage in March 2011.

Operation Tomodachi (Friend) ran from March 12 to May 4 during which 24,000 U.S. soldiers, sailors, marines, and airmen were engaged along with 189 aircraft and 24 naval ships at a cost of $90 million. Said Defense Minister Toshimi Kitazawa, “I have never been more encouraged by and proud of the fact that the United States is our ally.鈥�

Goodwill between American and Japanese was personified by Ambassador Edwin Reischauer. He had been born in Japan, pursued a scholarly career in Japanese history at Harvard, was married to a Japanese of a prominent family, and spoke Japanese well enough to correct his interpreter if he made a mistake.

Reischauer adopted a diplomatic ploy that most Japanese found hard to counter. He wrapped himself in the mantle of 鈥渟ensei,鈥� or teacher, who are deeply respected in Japan, and proclaimed American policy. Even senior officials in Washington were intimidated. Said one: 鈥淲ho鈥檚 going to argue with Ed Reischauer about Japan?鈥�

Against this backdrop came Ichiro to add to the reservoir of goodwill. More than one Japanese have seen him as a samurai reflecting the best in the Japanese tradition of honor, service, and loyalty. A fan in Tokyo was quoted several years ago: 鈥淭he way he hits is just like a samurai. I’ll bet he could split a mosquito with a sword.”

As might be expected, not everyone in America has seen Ichiro in a favorable light and some have ignited the kind of dispute that baseball fans relish as they sit around a pot-bellied stove to argue through a winter鈥檚 night. The main charge: Ichiro delivered about a third of his hits in the less competitive baseball league in Japan.

Among those who sniffed at Ichiro鈥檚 4,000 hits , the retired player and manager who spent much of his professional career with the Cincinnati Reds and holds the record of 4256 hits. (Ty Cobb was second with 4191). Rose asserted that Ichiro鈥檚 hits in Japan didn鈥檛 count and the Japanese would never reach his record.

The captain of the New York Yankees, Derek Jeter, brushed that aside, saying Ichiro鈥檚 achievement was 鈥減retty impressive. I don’t care if it’s 4,000 hits in Little League.鈥�

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It would be tempting to dismiss this as bureaucratic maneuvering in a time of budget crisis 鈥� and it is, to be sure. But how a proposal for fundamental change is sorted out will also reveal much about how U.S. leaders see the world, how they define threats to U.S. security and how they intend to meet those dangers.

The name and nature of the nine 鈥渃ombatant commands鈥� has been opened to question. Critics assert that their tasks often have little to do with military operations. Rather the forces seek to engage other militaries to build partnerships or to deter potential adversaries, to furnish aid, to undertake peacekeeping and to support disaster relief.

Moreover, the four-star general or admiral in charge of a regional command is a proconsul, with more authority than any ambassador. The Pacific Commander鈥檚 reach, for instance, extends from South Korea to Sri Lanka. In contrast, the U.S. ambassador鈥檚 reach in Tokyo extends only to Okinawa.

Officials in the State Department, Central Intelligence Agency and other agencies often argue that the military services should align themselves with their civilian counterparts. South Asia, for example, is in one division in State but is divided between two regional military commands.

The issue is thus politically touchy. A spokesman for the Pacific Command thus declined to comment. A Pentagon official said only: 鈥淭he Joint Staff continually reviews a wide variety of options for the joint force and how it can be structured more efficiently.鈥�

Among the specific issues under scrutiny is combining the Northern Command, which is responsible for defending the continental U.S., with the Southern Command, which covers Latin America. Advocates contend that would cut headquarter staffs; opponents argue that missions in North and South America require different approaches.

Another proposition would dissolve the Africa Command, which is only five years old and has not proven effective. Its operations would be divided and shifted to the European Command and the Central Command, which operates in the Middle East. More staff cutting would result.

Still another idea is doing away with most of the regional commands in favor of one responsible for the close-in defense of the continental U.S. and two more, one on the Atlantic Coast, the other on the Pacific Coast, to operate overseas. Drawing a boundary between them someplace in Eurasia would depend on circumstances later.

Critical to a sweeping revision would be changes in the Pacific Command, in military lingo PACOM, with its headquarters in Hawaii. It is the largest of the U.S. commands and may be the largest geographic command in the world, stretching from the West Coast of the U.S. across the Pacific and Indian Oceans to the East Coast of Africa.

A key decision would be the place of security relations with India in the U.S. scheme of things. Three possibilities:

• Status quo, in which India remains in PACOM and arch-rival Pakistan remains in the province of Central Command, or CENTCOM. Advocates argue that the present setup works and it would be better to keep separate the relations with nuclear-armed India and Pakistan, as with China in PACOM and Russia in the European Command. Officers in each command work constantly with counterparts in the other command.

• Moving India and several smaller South Asian nations out of PACOM鈥檚 purview to the domain of CENTCOM. Advocates contend that shrinking PACOM would help overcome the 鈥渢yranny of distance鈥� in this region and ease operational control. It would also ease dealing with the diverse cultures of East and Southeast Asia. And it would permit PACOM to focus more on China, potentially a powerful adversary.
• Quite the opposite, some argue, Pakistan should be shifted from CENTCOM to be in the same command as India. Advocates say that every decision about one must take the other into account. Moreover, Pakistan is a client of China and moves that PACOM plans vis-脿-vis China must consider Pakistan. Further, because Pakistan is so connected with Afghanistan, it too would be absorbed into PACOM.

How the Obama administration sorts out these issues may tell Americans 鈥� and everyone else 鈥� how serious are its plans to 鈥減ivot鈥� or 鈥渞ebalance鈥� toward Asia.

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The political coalition he leads won a solid victory in the July elections for the upper house of the Diet. Polls show that his plan for economic recovery, known as Abenomics, is widely accepted. And his approval rating among the electorate hovers around a sturdy 65 percent.

However 鈥� and this is a huge however 鈥� the prime minister will most likely fail to achieve his ambitions in foreign policy and national security unless he finds a way to resolve what is known as 鈥渢he history question.鈥� As some scholars phrase it, the 鈥渄emons of history鈥� prevent Japan from taking its rightful place among the world鈥檚 foremost nations.

This is a vital question not only for Japan but for the U.S. and its allies in Asia. In particular, bitter relations between Japan and South Korea, rooted in history but now both treaty allies of the U.S., undermine the security of all three. If the history issue is allowed to fester, the damage will only get worse.

The litany of charges against Japan centers on the period from 1931 to 1945. Japan occupied Taiwan (from 1895), Korea (from 1910), and Manchuria (from 1931), invaded Southeast Asia to the gates of India, committed wartime atrocities such as the Rape of Nanking in China, and exploited 鈥渃omfort women鈥� for sexual services for soldiers.

The record shows that Japanese leaders have apologized or expressed remorse for these offenses more than 50 times. That began with the late Emperor Hirohito to General Douglas MacArthur, commander of the Allied Occupation, in 1945 and Prime Minister Shigeru Yoshida in addressing the San Francisco Peace Conference in 1951.

No matter. The Chinese, South Koreans, North Koreans, and a smattering of others have refused to acknowledge or accept those apologies for reasons of their own. Some of their stance arises from the genuine anger of the victims. For others, it’s a convenient club with which to attack Japan or is a distraction from pressing issues at home.

Moreover, the Chinese and Koreans have not said what they want nor what would satisfy them. A recent article in Xinhua, the official Chinese news agency, was typically vague: “Only by facing up to the history and seriously reflecting on its wartime crimes can Japan win back trust among people in Asia and across the world.鈥�

It may not be fair to urge the Japanese to confront this issue yet again 鈥� but nobody said international politics was fair. That鈥檚 the reality that Prime Minister Abe and his colleagues must address if they want to drive the demons of history back into the pages of a tattered textbook on social studies.

Here are three suggestions for a compelling and vivid Japanese endeavor to resolve this issue:

• Have a bright young researcher in the Foreign Ministry comb through the accounts of Japanese apologies since 1945, including the context in which they were uttered, and compile them into an authoritative record of remorse. Have that record translated from Japanese into Chinese, Korean, and English and published for the world to see.
• Ask Emperor Akihito, the current ruler and son of Emperor Hirohito, to rise in the Budokan (Hall of Martial Arts) on August 15 at the annual gathering of Japanese leaders to mark the end of World War II, and deliver the final expression of remorse. Only the Emperor has the moral and constitutional authority to speak of all of Japan.
• Quietly negotiate with the Chinese and Korean governments to determine what they would accept and seek to accommodate them. Whether that effort succeeds or not, Japan should include in the record of remorse and in the Emperor鈥檚 address a declaration that this question is now closed and no longer a topic for public debate.

Further, Japan could eliminate a lightning rod for Chinese and Korean criticism by moving the spirits of 14 war criminals from the Yasukuni Shrine and enshrining them elsewhere. Yasukuni is a Shinto shrine, not a cemetery, for the spirits of Japan鈥檚 war dead, similar to the Kranji War Memorial in Singapore, India Gate in New Delhi, and the Vietnam Wall in Washington.

August is when Americans, Japanese, and other Asians mark the end of World War II. In August of 2013, Prime Minister Abe could start trying to resolve the history question. In August of 2014, Japan could declare the issue settled. And In August of 2015, Mr. Abe might look back on an accomplishment that serves all concerned.

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