The Quandary of Religious Freedom
Freedom of belief is surely desirable, beneficial, and crucial for achieving human dignity and happiness. It is nonetheless personally and politically unsettling.
Everyone desires freedom, certainly freedom of belief, speech and assembly. When a government guarantees these as rights, who can complain?
A Kentucky state employee is jailed when she says, 鈥淕od is my boss, not the government.鈥 As with many ancient religious traditions, local Hawaiian Aloha Aina activists protest against being denied access to areas of the islands considered sacred.
The government assumes authority to judge the validity and to restrict the extent of such claims.
听The government is, in effect, somewhat like a parent who tells children they are free to choose, only to find this freedom used to override the authority of the parent.
The constitutional guarantee of 鈥渇ree exercise鈥 appears to sanction individual self-rule when choosing and practicing a belief system. But religions typically presume allegiance to some higher non-governmental authority. Although there may be common agreement on many principles, some possible trade-offs and compromises on others, conceding subordination on essential matters cannot be tolerated by religions or governments.
In a democratic society, pluralism (pluribus) is to be expected. Holding it together (as unum), however, is a constant challenge. The government remedies conflicts of interest through judicial processes where constitutional principles have supreme authority. Religions remedy conflicts by being guided by authorities in their tradition. These outrank human authorities in cases of conflict.
If thought of as computer programs, government and religion operate with different algorithms.
When confronting controversies such as genetic engineering, abortion, animal rights, marriage, terrorism, and so on, each fire up according to their specific algorithmic patterns.
Put otherwise, the very meaning of basic terms, when in the context of different ideological lineages such as the Bible, Quran, Analects, Gita, or Buddha Dharma, will not be the same. Could 鈥榯rust鈥 in the motto 鈥淚n God we trust鈥 signify the same as 鈥淚n Buddha (Krishna, et al.) we trust鈥?
Religions commonly advocate more prominently values such as love, compassion, uplifting care, do unto others, aloha, or peace. As remedies for basic conflicts, however, these admirable ideals have their practical and ideological limits. When confronting adverse circumstances or opposing belief systems, such ideals quickly become adjusted to meet the reality of the circumstances.
It is evident the United States government, though not establishing an official religion, has given preferential status to Christianity. The original founders thought it prudent to find sanction in both nature and nature鈥檚 God.
The dominate culture has, in effect, supported specific religious affiliations in public life. Pledging allegiance to 鈥渙ne nation under God,鈥 as benign as it may seem to the culturally indoctrinated, is detrimental to principles of impartiality, equality and fairness.
If reasoned discussion about such matters has its limits, rule by majority or representatives as authoritative is also problematical. The position of 鈥渂oss,鈥 鈥渨here the buck stops,鈥 鈥渢he final authority鈥 remains a legitimate matter of dispute. How is a master narrative to be settled?
Someone might suggest there is hope if people are willing to admit their fallibility in choosing and participating in a world view. Could the certainty we desire be beyond our capacities to realize? What would happen if political and religious leaders were to conclude their messages with 鈥溾 but I may be mistaken about this鈥?
On both social and personal levels we are caught in a perplexing quandary. If I am free to believe X, this legitimizes my opposition to not-Xs. My belief functions to reject the credibility of other belief options.
But, and here is the kicker, in order to support the legitimacy of my own freedom to believe X, I must protect it by legitimizing the entitlement of others to be able to exercise their freedom to believe not-X. My freedom depends for its authorization on others who in turn recognize the dependency of their freedom on my and others’ acknowledgement. We must tolerate what our individual beliefs tell us is not acceptable for the sake of freedom.
鈥淔ree individuals鈥 do not exist in isolation but interdependently, with other persons, in social, political and environmental conditions. It is the exercise of freedom, such as it is, that can best serve to teach the parameters of freedom and the value of accommodation. The solace to be found here is, however, at odds with the natural desire to get the ultimate things right for oneself, implementing them with as little compromise as is feasible.
Freedom of belief is surely desirable, beneficial, and crucial for achieving human dignity and the pursuit of happiness. It is nonetheless personally and politically unsettling. We cannot count on others to respect this quandary, yet 鈥渉and-in-hand鈥 we all go, trying to manage our own beliefs while being impelled to resist the beliefs of others who oppose our beliefs.
Recognizing this predicament is valuable even as it does not lessen its impact on our lives.
