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Rumbling through the Pentagon, the regional military formations like the Pacific Command and the ranks of defense intellectuals in think tanks is a proposal to rearrange the way the U.S. defends its worldwide interests.

It would be tempting to dismiss this as bureaucratic maneuvering in a time of budget crisis — and it is, to be sure. But how a proposal for fundamental change is sorted out will also reveal much about how U.S. leaders see the world, how they define threats to U.S. security and how they intend to meet those dangers.

The name and nature of the nine “combatant commands” has been opened to question. Critics assert that their tasks often have little to do with military operations. Rather the forces seek to engage other militaries to build partnerships or to deter potential adversaries, to furnish aid, to undertake peacekeeping and to support disaster relief.

Moreover, the four-star general or admiral in charge of a regional command is a proconsul, with more authority than any ambassador. The Pacific Commander’s reach, for instance, extends from South Korea to Sri Lanka. In contrast, the U.S. ambassador’s reach in Tokyo extends only to Okinawa.

Officials in the State Department, Central Intelligence Agency and other agencies often argue that the military services should align themselves with their civilian counterparts. South Asia, for example, is in one division in State but is divided between two regional military commands.

The issue is thus politically touchy. A spokesman for the Pacific Command thus declined to comment. A Pentagon official said only: “The Joint Staff continually reviews a wide variety of options for the joint force and how it can be structured more efficiently.”

Among the specific issues under scrutiny is combining the Northern Command, which is responsible for defending the continental U.S., with the Southern Command, which covers Latin America. Advocates contend that would cut headquarter staffs; opponents argue that missions in North and South America require different approaches.

Another proposition would dissolve the Africa Command, which is only five years old and has not proven effective. Its operations would be divided and shifted to the European Command and the Central Command, which operates in the Middle East. More staff cutting would result.

Still another idea is doing away with most of the regional commands in favor of one responsible for the close-in defense of the continental U.S. and two more, one on the Atlantic Coast, the other on the Pacific Coast, to operate overseas. Drawing a boundary between them someplace in Eurasia would depend on circumstances later.

Critical to a sweeping revision would be changes in the Pacific Command, in military lingo PACOM, with its headquarters in Hawaii. It is the largest of the U.S. commands and may be the largest geographic command in the world, stretching from the West Coast of the U.S. across the Pacific and Indian Oceans to the East Coast of Africa.

A key decision would be the place of security relations with India in the U.S. scheme of things. Three possibilities:

• Status quo, in which India remains in PACOM and arch-rival Pakistan remains in the province of Central Command, or CENTCOM. Advocates argue that the present setup works and it would be better to keep separate the relations with nuclear-armed India and Pakistan, as with China in PACOM and Russia in the European Command. Officers in each command work constantly with counterparts in the other command.

• Moving India and several smaller South Asian nations out of PACOM’s purview to the domain of CENTCOM. Advocates contend that shrinking PACOM would help overcome the “tyranny of distance” in this region and ease operational control. It would also ease dealing with the diverse cultures of East and Southeast Asia. And it would permit PACOM to focus more on China, potentially a powerful adversary.
• Quite the opposite, some argue, Pakistan should be shifted from CENTCOM to be in the same command as India. Advocates say that every decision about one must take the other into account. Moreover, Pakistan is a client of China and moves that PACOM plans vis-à-vis China must consider Pakistan. Further, because Pakistan is so connected with Afghanistan, it too would be absorbed into PACOM.

How the Obama administration sorts out these issues may tell Americans — and everyone else — how serious are its plans to “pivot” or “rebalance” toward Asia.